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Abstract: A principal-agent model is formulated to capture the efficiency of cooperatives with a 
member CEO and cooperatives with an employed outsider as CEO. Results of the model show 
that the incentive strength regarding the member CEO is stronger compared to that of the outside 
CEO in order to shift some effort of the member CEO from individual farming into the task of 
adding value to the cooperative enterprise. A cooperative with a member CEO is uniquely 
efficient when upstream and downstream tasks are substitutes to a certain extent, or complements. 
When the tasks are substitutes, the efficient CEO identity depends on the strength of the 
substitution effect and the difference of the marginal productivities between the two tasks. The 
scope of cooperatives with a member CEO being efficient becomes smaller when the substitution 
effect is at an intermediate level or the productivity difference between the two tasks is limited. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The changing economic environment has led many farmer cooperatives in both developed and 
developing countries to undertake substantial governance structure changes. Cooperatives adopt 
various strategies to adapt to different environments and situations. Among these various 
strategies, the management of cooperatives is regarded as an important tool affecting the 
economic performance of cooperatives (Fama, 1980; Cook, 1994). Cooperative management 
differs from the management of investor-owned firms (IOFs) due to the user-owner relationship. 
The management of an IOF focuses on the objective to maximize the capital investment return 
for investors, whereas the management of a cooperative has to take into consideration members’ 
interests. Members’ interests are more complex than those of owners of IOFs. Owners or 
members of cooperatives may have not only monetary interests in marketing, but also 
expectations like utilizing the cooperative services and finding a home for products. Another 
aspect of the management difference between cooperatives and IOFs is that managers in a 
cooperative may also be owners of the cooperative enterprise. A cooperative has therefore to 
choose as a manager either a member who has residual claim rights of the cooperative or an 
outsider who is purely employed without residual claim rights. These differences and 
possibilities will be reflected in the incentives facing the manager in the model presented in this 
article.  
Cooperatives in different countries differ in the CEO identity. The management of most 
cooperatives in China is executed by members (Liang & Hendrikse, 2012). Very few 
cooperatives in China employ outsiders as CEOs. The reverse holds for cooperatives in western 
countries. Most cooperatives employ outside CEOs as well as outside directors. For example, 
Burress and Cook (2010) identified only one cooperative with a member CEO in their sample of 
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1000 cooperatives. This situation is more mixed in Spain and Brazil. These countries have 
cooperatives with member CEOs as well as cooperatives with outside CEOs.  
Member CEOs usually have substantial capabilities in physical capital, marketing, management, 
or social relations, etc, compared to other common members. A member CEO has multiple roles: 
a member or supplier of the cooperative, a member of the management, a member of the board 
of directors, and/or a member of the board of supervisors of the cooperative 2, while other 
members are mainly producers, inputs suppliers, and residual claimants of the cooperative. 
The identity and composition of the management and the board can have an impact on the 
performance of the cooperative (Cook, 1994; Lang 2002; Dunn et al., 2002).  However, little is 
known about the influence of cooperative CEO identity on the efficiency of the coopertive. We 
examine the efficient CEO identity of the cooperative. A member CEO is incentivized by 
ownership and residual claim rights, while an outside CEO receives a fixed salary and a payment 
based on measured performance. An outside CEO is incentivized to care about member interests 
and the value of the cooperative enterprise, whereas a member CEO, as both input supplier and 
an agent, is in addition concerned with the value of his or her individual farm.  
This paper addresses the following questions: 1) When is it efficient for a cooperative to delegate 
the management of the enterprise to a member instead of an outside CEO? 2) What is the optimal 
incentive intensity regarding each CEO in order to maximize the value of the cooperative 
enterprise? and 3) What is the optimal effort devoted to tasks by each CEO? 
The paper is organized as follows. Theories regarding the management in cooperatives and 
differences of CEOs in cooperatives and in IOFs are addressed in section 2. Section 3 is 
                                                        
2 Besides the member CEOs who are both farmers and managers, another type of member CEOs is also 
observed in cooperatives in China. This latter type of member CEO discards individual farming and focuses on the 
management of cooperatives. We focus on the former type of member CEO in this study. 
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dedicated to the model. Section 4 presents the equilibrium results. Efficient CEO identity and 
task interdependencies are analyzed in section 5. Managerial productivity differences are 
highlighted in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2 THEORY 
This section addresses the impact of the management and the board of an enterprise on its 
performance (2.1) and identifies the differences between CEOs in cooperatives and IOFs (2.2). 
2.1 Impact of The Management and The Board on Performance 
The impact of the management and the board on enterprise performance is addressed in various 
studies (Daily & Dalton, 1993; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Adams et al, 2008; Hillman et al, 
2007). Board characteristics taken into account are size, composition, CEO duality, and the size 
of the enterprise. Jensen (1993) suggests that smaller boards have a positive impact on 
performance due to more effective monitoring. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) establish 
empirically that firms with a large management team perform better. Moreover, firms with 
dominant CEOs perform worse in a turbulent environment than in a stable environment. Board 
composition refers to the distinction between inside and outside directors. Studies regarding the 
relationship between the ratio of outside directors and firm performance vary from positive to 
zero, to negative. Outside directors may extract and provide important sources from the 
environment that are unavailable to inside directors (Daily & Dalton, 1993), while inside 
directors have more information about their firm operation and may perform better when their 
ownership stake is larger (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pearce, 1983). Daily and Dalton (1993) 
address CEO duality, i.e. the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. They examine two forms 
of management, i.e. entrepreneurial management and professional management, and find that 
most founder-managed firms or firms with entrepreneurial management are likely to be 
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characterized by CEO duality. They establish that there is no significant relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance. The size of the enterprise is also relevant. The management 
and the board of directors may be able to more directly influence organizational processes and 
outcomes in small firms than in large firms (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). 
Attention has also been paid to specify management issues in farmer cooperatives (Cook, 1994; 
Lang 2002; Dunn et al., 2002; Bond, 2009, Burress et al., 2011; Burress & Cook, 2010 and so 
on). Examples are the role of the management, the compensation of the management, and the 
impact of the management on the performance of cooperative enterprise. Characteristics of the 
management and the board that have an effect on performance of cooperatives are size and 
composition of the board. Bond (2009) establishes that board size exerts a limited influence on 
the cooperative financial performance. Yet Lang (2002) points out that a reduction in board size 
can lead to greater accountability, less anonymity, and more efficient board meetings. A negative 
relationship between size and performance is also indicated by some empirical analyses (Burress 
& Cook, 2010; Burress et al., 2011). Agricultural cooperatives are restructuring towards more 
entrepreneurial organizations (Bijman & Doorneweert, 2008), as the market competition between 
enterprises is becoming more and more fierce. 
Bond (2009) argues that cooperatives’ boards may suffer from more severe governance problems 
than their corporate counterparts like IOFs due to the identity of directors. Identity of directors 
refers to inside directors who are members and outside directors who are non-members. 
Therefore inside directors and outside directors are also called owner-directors and non-member 
directors respectively. Owner-directors of cooperatives are often professionals in agricultural 
production technique and management. However, they are not always sufficiently professional in 
making sound decisions and firm management. Lang (2002) observes that even capable member 
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directors lack the range of skills needed on the board. In addition, owner-directors may use 
power to make decisions that benefit the individual at the expense of the cooperative enterprise 
(Dunn et al., 2000). The employment of full-time and professional board members therefore is 
recommended (Dunn et al., 2000; Bond, 2009). However, Burress and Cook (2010) think owner 
directors are more likely to make value-maximizing decisions because they bear the wealth 
effects of their actions. Besides, an active and engaged board contributes to higher performance 
of the cooperative. Burress et al. (2011) find no support for a relationship between board equity 
holdings and performance.  
Ownership is an important factor in influencing job design and incentive contracting. The idea 
that stock ownership by management can reduce the underlying agency problem follows directly 
from agency theory. More stock owned by the management provides stronger motivation to work 
and raises the value of the firm’s stock (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). When the agent owns the 
asset returns, he or she will be more motivated to pursuing the value of the asset (Holmström & 
Milgrom, 1991). Therefore low-powered incentives may be sufficient to motivate the agent. 
Holmström and Milgrom (1991) further elaborate the favorable conditions for an agent to own 
the assets, i.e. that the agent is not too risk averse, the variance of asset returns is low, and the 
variance of measurement error in other aspects of the agent’s performance is low.  
2.2 CEOs in Cooperatives Versus Investor-Owned Firms 
CEOs play a significant role in the performance of an organization (Thomas, 1988). CEOs’ 
behavior, compensation, and their relationship with performance are studied frequently by 
applying the principal-agent model (Tosi Jr. & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Garen, 1994; Haubrich, 
1994; Wang 1997). Agency relationships exist whenever an individual or organization (the agent) 
acts on behalf of another (the principal) (Ortmann & King, 2007). Principal-agent problems arise 
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because the interests of the agent are usually not the same as the interests of the principal. The 
agent may therefore not completely pursue the interests of the principal (Royer, 1999; Sykuta & 
Chaddad, 1999). 
Most principal-agent studies focus on CEOs in corporations or investor-owned firms, rather than 
user-owned cooperatives. The relationship in cooperatives is more complex than that in IOFs 
(Staatz, 1987; Cook, 1994; Royer, 1999; Huang, 2008). There are various reasons, like 
memberships in cooperatives are more heterogeneous than shareholders in an IOF (Staatz, 1987; 
Royer, 1999); sometimes a CEO in a cooperative has dual identities, an agent and meanwhile a 
member (Huang, 2008); cooperatives have to take the interests of two stages of production into 
account (Feng & Hendrikse, 2012), and so on. CEOs in cooperatives and in IOFs are different in 
terms of several dimensions. Firstly, CEOs of a cooperative and an IOF have different objectives. 
CEOs in a cooperative maximize returns to patron members, while CEOs in IOFs try to 
maximize returns to investors (Hueth & Marcoul, 2009). Members are users and in the meantime 
owners of the cooperative enterprise. Members therefore have at least two sets of concerns, i.e. 
owner concerns and user concerns (Feng & Hendrikse, 2012). Owner concerns involve the 
security and overall profitability of their investments in the cooperative, while user concerns are 
issues of the pricing and quality of product and services. CEOs in cooperatives therefore bring 
the downstream enterprise to value and in the meantime serve upstream member interests. 
Secondly, incentive mechanisms between the CEOs’ performance in a cooperative and in an IOF 
are different. The distinguishing feature of a cooperative’s residual rights, their restriction to the 
patron agents, prevents them from being publicly listed, which leads to the absence of 
marketable common stock in cooperatives (Staatz, 1987; Royer, 1999; Hendrikse, 2007; Feng & 
Hendrikse, 2012). Therefore the value of cooperative enterprises is not easy to be measured and 
 9 
subsequently designing incentive contracts for a cooperative CEO seems not easy. The 
compensation for CEOs in cooperatives is expected to be less reliant on performance incentives 
(Hueth & Marcoul, 2009). Feng and Hendrikse (2012) examine the different roles of a CEO in a 
cooperative and a CEO in an IOF, taking into account the absence of public listing of a 
cooperative. They determine the circumstances where cooperatives and IOFs are respectively 
efficient in a multi-task principal-agent model. There are two concerns that a CEO of a 
cooperative cares about, bringing the downstream enterprise to value and serving upstream 
member interests. They consider only the case of a cooperative with an outsider as CEO. 
However, many cooperatives, especially in China, Spain, and Brazil, have one of the members as 
a CEO, rather than employing an outsider. A member CEO not only devotes attention to member 
interests and enterprise value, but also dedicates effort to his or her individual farm. Out model is 
geared towards the implication of the distinction between a member CEO and an outside CEO. 
3 MODEL 
A principal-agent model is formulated to capture the efficiency of cooperatives with different 
CEOs: a member CEO and an outside CEO. A member CEO has a dual identity in being a CEO 
as well as a member of the cooperative. We assume that members are on the one hand 
independent input suppliers and on the other hand residual claimants of the enterprise. Members 
therefore receive incomes of both individual farming and allocated revenue of the downstream 
enterprise’s profits.  
A cooperative either has a member CEO or an outside CEO. They are distinguished by their 
activities. A member CEO allocates efforts between the two tasks of individual farming and 
enterprise’s value adding activities, while an outside CEO has no farming activities and focuses 
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therefore only in value adding activities at the cooperative enterprise. 3  Assume that the 
membership size of a cooperative is 𝑛 . Let 𝑛𝑚  be the number of members not being CEO. 
Therefore 𝑛𝑚 = 𝑛 − 1 in the cooperative with a member CEO, while 𝑛𝑚 = 𝑛 in the cooperative 
with an outside CEO. A member not being CEO devotes all his or her effort to individual 
farming. Both the member CEO and the outside CEO are assumed to be risk-neutral. 
The production function of the CEO is  
𝒚𝒄 = 𝒇𝑼𝒂𝑼𝒄 + 𝒇𝑫𝒂𝑫𝒄 , 
where aUc  and aDc  are the CEO's effort in the upstream farming task and effort in the downstream 
value adding activities respectively, and fU and fD are the marginal productivities of the upstream 
farming activity and downstream value adding activity. Each activity is nonnegative. 
A member not being CEO devotes all his or her effort to individual farming. The production 
function of member 𝑗 is 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑓𝑈𝑎𝑈𝑗 , 
where aUj  is the upstream production activity of member 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, 2, … ,𝑛𝑚. 
Assume that the function of personal cost related to each player’s activities is: 
𝑐(𝑖) = �𝑎𝑈𝑖 �2
2
+ 𝑘𝑎𝑈𝑖 𝑎𝐷𝑖 + �𝑎𝐷𝑖 �22 , 
where −1 < 𝑘 < 1 (Dixit, 2002; Feng & Hendrikse, 2012) and 𝑖 = 𝑐, 𝑗 , c = 𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑖𝑛  and 𝑗 =1, 2, … ,𝑛 .  The parameter 𝑘  captures the interdependencies between upstream farming and 
downstream value adding activities. If 𝑘  is positive (negative), then the two activities are 
substitutes (complements). When the two activities are substitutes, more effort in one activity 
increases the marginal cost of the other. An example is that the more time spent on farming, the 
                                                        
3 An extended model may distinguish three tasks for a member CEO and two tasks for an outside CEO. The three 
tasks of the member CEO are individual farming, advancing upstream members’ interests, and downstream value 
adding. The outside CEO does not have the individual farming task. We do not present this extended model because 
the equilibrium results of the model with extended tasks are the same as in the current model. 
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less time a CEO spends on marketing. When the two activities are complements, more effort in 
one activity benefits the other activity. An example is the coordination between production and 
processing. Production according to standardized quality may one the one hand reduce the cost 
of grading and on the other hand  enhance value-added processing. 
Assume that the wage paid to the CEO is a linear function, i.e. 𝑤 = 𝑠 + 𝑏𝑓𝐷𝑎𝐷𝑐 , where s refers to 
the fixed salary and b captures the bonus rate based on measured performance of the CEO. The 
payoff (utility) function of member 𝑗 consists of his or her farm payoff and the residual claim 
payoff, that is 
𝜋𝑗 = 𝑓𝑈𝑎𝑈𝑗 + (1−𝑏𝑛 𝑓𝐷𝑎𝐷𝑐 − 𝑠𝑛) − �𝑎𝑈𝑗 �22 . 
The payoff (utility) function of the outside CEO is 
𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑠 + 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑓𝐷𝑎𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 − �𝑎𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜�22 . 
The payoff (utility) function of the inside member CEO consists of his or her income from being 
a member and his or her wage as CEO, that is 
𝜋𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑈𝑎𝑈𝑖𝑛 + (1−𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝐷𝑎𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 𝑠𝑛) + 𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝐷𝑎𝐷𝑖𝑛 − ��𝑎𝑈𝑖𝑖�22 + 𝑘𝑎𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐷𝑖𝑛 + �𝑎𝐷𝑖𝑖�22 �. 
The total surplus of the 𝑛𝑚 members is 
𝜋𝑚 = ∑ �𝑓𝑈𝑎𝑈𝑗 + 1−𝑏𝑛 𝑓𝐷𝑎𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 𝑠𝑛 − �𝑎𝑈𝑗 �22 �𝑛𝑚𝑗=1 . 
Total surplus, i.e. the payoff of the CEO and the 𝑛𝑚 members, is 
𝜋𝑇
𝑐 = 𝜋𝑐 + 𝜋𝑚, 
where 𝑐 = 𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑖𝑛. We have therefore 
𝜋𝑇 = ∑ 𝑓𝑈𝑎𝑈𝑗𝑛𝑚𝑗=1 +𝑓𝑈𝑎𝑈𝑐 + 𝑓𝐷𝑎𝐷𝑐 − �∑ �𝑎𝑈𝑗 �22 +𝑛𝑚𝑗=1 �𝑎𝑈𝑐 �22 + 𝑘𝑎𝑈𝑐 𝑎𝐷𝑐 + �𝑎𝐷𝑐 �22 �. 
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The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, incentives of the CEO are determined. In the 
second stage, the CEO and the members choose simultaneously activities that maximize their 
payoff. 
4 EQUILIBRIUM  
The backward induction method is used to solve the game. First, the payoff maximizing 
activities of the players are determined, given the incentive strength. The equilibrium incentive 
strength in the CEOs’ compensation is determined next. 
Each member chooses the effort to 𝑚𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑈
𝑗  𝜋𝑗 and simultaneously the CEO chooses his or her 
optimal effort by maximizing his or her payoff, i.e. 𝑚𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑈𝑐 ,𝑎𝐷𝑐  𝜋𝑐 . In the cooperative with an 
outsider as CEO, the payoff maximizing activity of the CEO is 𝑎𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜
∗ = 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑓𝐷 , while in the 
cooperative with a member CEO, the payoff maximizing activities of the member CEO are 
𝑎𝑈
𝑖𝑛∗ = �𝑓𝑈 − (1+𝑛𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑖𝑖)𝑛 𝑘𝑓𝐷� (1 − 𝑘2)�  and 𝑎𝐷𝑖𝑛∗ = ��1+𝑛𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑖𝑖�𝑛 𝑓𝐷 − 𝑘𝑓𝑈� (1 − 𝑘2)� . The 
payoff maximizing activity of member 𝑗 in both the cooperative with an outside CEO and the 
cooperative with a member CEO is 𝑎𝑈
𝑗 ∗ = 𝑓𝑈. 
Neither the activities of the outside CEO nor the activities of each member is influenced by the 
membership size. However, the activities of the member CEO are affected by the membership 
size. The surplus produced by the member CEO’s downstream task is distributed to the whole 
membership. The larger the membership size, the less effort the member CEO puts into the 
downstream task, given the level of bonus rate. However, if all the surplus from the downstream 
task is allocated to the member CEO, then the activities of the member CEO are independent of 
the membership size.  
The members are the principals. They choose the bonus rate that maximizes their total payoff. 
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Anticipating the activities of the CEO, the principals chooses a bonus rate to motivate the CEO. 
Suppose that 𝑏𝑐∗ , where c = 𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑖𝑛 , is the bonus rate that maximizes the payoff of the 
membership. The identity of the principals differs between the two cooperatives. Consider first 
the cooperative with an outside CEO. The equilibrium bonus rate is 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜∗ = 1 2⁄ . Activities of 
both the CEO and each member are independent of the membership size. The bonus rate is 
therefore independent of the membership size as well. 
In the cooperative with a member CEO, both the member CEO and members are the principals. 
The equilibrium bonus rate in the cooperative with a member CEO is 𝑏𝑖𝑛∗ = 1. Since the payoff 
of the member CEO is included as part of the total payoff of the members and the CEO has the 
rights to choose the bonus rate for himself as well, a stronger incentive leads to  a higher surplus 
of the cooperative.  
The incentive intensity regarding the member CEO is stronger compared to the outside CEO. 
This result is distinct from, but closely related to, the observation of Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) that the incentives offered to employees in firms are lower than that offered to 
independent contractors. Employees in their model have no ownership rights over the asset, 
while contractors use and develop their own assets and they shoulder risks of the asset. The 
member CEO therefore needs a higher incentive. In addition, the member CEO’s farming task is 
regarded by the membership as an outside or private activity of the member CEO, whereas the 
surplus produced by the downstream task belong to the cooperative. A higher bonus rate 
therefore is needed to motivate the member CEO to devote effort to the downstream task over 
the upstream task. 
The total surplus, and its composition, is determined by plugging the equilibrium value of the 
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various activities in the surplus expression. 4 The total surplus when the cooperative has an 
outsider as CEO is 
𝜋𝑇
𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑛𝑓𝑈2
2
+ 3𝑓𝐷2
8
. 
The total surplus when the cooperative has a member CEO is 
𝜋𝑇
𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑈2+𝑓𝐷2−2𝑘𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷
2(1−𝑘2) + (𝑛−1)𝑓𝑈22 . 
5 EFFICIENT CEO IDENTITY AND TASK INTERDEPENDENCIES 
Let ∆𝜋 = 𝜋𝑇𝑖𝑛 − 𝜋𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜, i.e. ∆𝜋 captures the difference in surplus between the cooperative with a 
member CEO and the cooperative with an outside CEO in equilibrium. We have therefore 
∆𝜋 = �4𝑓𝑈2+3𝑓𝐷2�𝑘2−8𝑘𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷+𝑓𝐷2
8(1−𝑘2) . 
If there is no interdependency between the upstream farming activity and the downstream value 
adding activity, i.e. 𝑘 = 0 , the payoff  difference ∆𝜋 = 𝑓𝐷2
8
  is non-negative. Therefore the 
cooperative with a member CEO is always efficient, if there is no interdependency between the 
member CEO’s upstream farming task and downstream value adding task. When the two tasks 
are complements, i.e. −1 < 𝑘 < 0, the cooperative with a member CEO is the unique efficient 
governance structure, i.e. ∆𝜋 > 0. 
When the two tasks are substitutes, i.e. 0 < 𝑘 < 1, the efficient CEO identity depends on both 
the substitution effect between tasks and the marginal productivity of tasks. There are two 
reasons why a cooperative with a member CEO may become inefficient when tasks are 
substitutes: the size of the substitution effect and productivity differences between tasks. The first 
reason is a high level of 𝑘. This increases the cost level. The effort that the member CEO puts in 
one task will increase the cost of the other task, which is disadvantageous to the cooperative with 
                                                        
4 The surpluses of the various players are presented in the Appendix. 
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a member CEO. The disadvantageous substitution effect is compensated for by the stronger 
incentive for the member CEO when 𝑘 is small. In addition, the member CEO tends to put most 
effort in one task when 𝑘 is quite large to eliminate the disadvantage caused by the substitution 
effect. Therefore when the two tasks are substitutes, the cooperative with a member CEO is 
efficient if 0 < k< 4𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷−�12(𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷)2−3𝑓𝐷4
4𝑓𝑈
2+3𝑓𝐷
2  or 
4𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷+�12(𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷)2−3𝑓𝐷4
4𝑓𝑈
2+3𝑓𝐷
2 < 𝑘 < 1 , whereas the 
cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient at intermediate levels, i.e. 
𝑘 ∈ �
4𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷−�12(𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷)2−3𝑓𝐷4
4𝑓𝑈
2+3𝑓𝐷
2 , 4𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷+�12(𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷)2−3𝑓𝐷44𝑓𝑈2+3𝑓𝐷2 �, subject to 𝑓𝐷 𝑓𝑈⁄ < 2. 
The second reason for the inefficiency of a cooperative with a member CEO is the productivity 
difference between alternative tasks. The cooperative with a member CEO may be efficient when 
the productivity difference between tasks is large because the CEO can devote most effort to the 
task with higher productivity. Besides, the stronger incentive for the member CEO creates an 
advantageous impact. To be more specific, if the ratio of the value adding task’s marginal 
productivity to the farming task’s marginal productivity, 𝑓𝐷 𝑓𝑈⁄ , is larger than  
4𝑘+2𝑘�3(1−𝑘2)
1+3𝑘2
 or 
smaller than 4𝑘−2𝑘�3(1−𝑘2)
1+3𝑘2
, then a cooperative with a member CEO is efficient. However, if the 
ratio 𝑓𝐷 𝑓𝑈⁄  is between 
4𝑘−2𝑘�3(1−𝑘2)
1+3𝑘2
  and 4𝑘+2𝑘�3(1−𝑘2)
1+3𝑘2
, then a cooperative with an outsider as 
CEO is uniquely efficient.  
Efficient governances as a function of the level of the task interdependencies and the 
productivity differences are depicted in Figure 1. A cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient 
in the grey area, while a cooperative with a member CEO is efficient outside the gray area. 
---------------------------------------- 
 16 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The complementarity between tasks provides an advantage to the cooperative with a member 
CEO. The effort that the member CEO devotes to one task reduces the cost of the other task, 
which determines the attractiveness of the cooperative with a member CEO. Cooperatives with 
member CEOs are therefore uniquely efficient when 𝑘 < 0.  
All the members, in both the cooperative with a member CEO and the cooperative with an 
outside CEO, devote the same effort 𝑓𝑈 to their farming. The member CEO receives a stronger 
bonus incentive than the outside CEO. The member CEO therefore provides more effort than the 
outside CEO, both on the individual farming task and on the enterprise’s value adding task. The 
cooperative with a member CEO is also efficient when 𝑘 = 0. 
The substitution effect creates additional cost of one task by devoting effort to the other task. 
Tasks being substitutable therefore have an unfavorable impact on the cooperative with a 
member CEO since the member CEO has multiple tasks while the outside CEO focuses on one 
task. The cooperative with a member CEO therefore is still desirable when the substitution effect 
is very small because the stronger incentive effect more than compensates for the 
disadvantageous substitution effect. As the substitution effect increases, the cooperative with an 
outside CEO is likely to become an efficient governance structure due to the disadvantage in the 
costs of the member CEO. However, if the substitution effect increases to such an extent that the 
member CEO would devote most effort in one task and little or no effort in another, the 
cooperative with a member CEO is desirable again. 
When the productivity of the downstream task is more than double the productivity of the 
upstream task, the cooperative with a member CEO is always efficient. There are two reasons. 
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First, the effort allocation of the member CEO would be skewed to the downstream task because 
of its high productivity. Second, the stronger incentive motivates the member CEO to devote 
more effort to the downstream task. However, the cooperative with a member CEO may become 
inefficient due to the productivity difference between alternative tasks is limited. It elicits similar 
levels of activity, and therefore a high level of the interaction term in the cost function. Another 
way of formulating this argument is that the disadvantage of the substitution effect is prevented 
in a cooperative with a member CEO by allocating effort to only one task, the one with the 
higher marginal productivity. This occurs when the difference of the marginal productivity 
between the two tasks is sufficiently large. For example, if the marginal productivity of the value 
adding business activities is much higher than that of farming, then the member CEO would 
devote most of his or her effort to the value adding task and little effort to the farming task. If the 
marginal productivity of farming is much higher than that of the downstream value adding 
activities, the member CEO would invest as much effort as possible in his or her individual 
farming task and little effort in the value adding task. As a consequence, the disadvantage 
derived from the two tasks being substitutable would be counterbalanced by allocating most of 
the effort to the task with the high marginal productivity.   
6 MANAGERIAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES 
The efficiency of enterprises with different identities of managers as well as directors of 
cooperatives has always been discussed. LeVay (1983) argues that farmer directors of farmer 
cooperatives are more production-oriented, while outside experts are more market-oriented. 
Outside directors have more information regarding the external market environment (Burress et 
al., 2011). In addition, Lind (2011) thinks that farmer directors lack knowledge regarding 
markets as well as product development. Therefore, we may have to consider the case when the 
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member CEO and the outside CEO differ regarding the marginal productivity of the value-
adding task. According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), outside directors do a better job of 
acting in shareholders’ interests than insiders when it comes to certain aspects of their jobs such 
as external information acquisition, whereas insiders are more likely to be preferred in other 
aspects such as information about the enterprise. Cook (1994) maintains that technical industry 
skills must be balanced with exceptional communication skills (such as conflict resolution, 
resource allocation, and information spokesperson) and the ability to develop group cohesiveness. 
This section addresses how the equilibrium results and the efficient governance structure depend 
on productivity differences between a member CEO and an outside CEO regarding the 
downstream task. The current model assumes that the member CEO and the outside CEO have 
the same marginal product with regard to the downstream value adding activity. However, a 
member CEO may be not as capable as a specialized outside CEO in the value-adding task. 
Denote the marginal productivities of the downstream value adding activities of the member 
CEO and the outside CEO to be 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 and 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 respectively. Then the equilibrium total payoff of 
the cooperative with a member CEO is 𝜋𝑇𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑈2+(𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖)2−2𝑘𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖2(1−𝑘2) + (𝑛−1)𝑓𝑈22 , while the total 
payoff of the cooperative with an outside CEO is 𝜋𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑛𝑓𝑈22 + 3�𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜�28 . As previously defined, 
∆𝜋 = 𝜋𝑇𝑖𝑛 − 𝜋𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜 . Therefore when 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 > � 2�3(1−𝑘2) (𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 𝑘𝑓𝑈)� , the cooperative with an 
outside CEO is efficient, and vice versa.5 
The relationship between efficient CEO identity and downstream marginal productivity 
differences are investigated now. Distinguish the cases no interdependency, complementarity, 
and substitution between the upstream and downstream tasks. Figure 2 depicts the relationship 
                                                        
5 The Appendix provides the expressions for the total payoffs when the downstream maginal productivities differ. 
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when tasks are independent. When k=0, we have 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 2√3 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛. The cooperative with an outside 
CEO is efficient if 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 > 2√3 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 , while the cooperative with a member CEO is efficient if 
𝑓𝐷
𝑜𝑜𝑜 < 2
√3
𝑓𝐷
𝑖𝑛. A cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient if it is located in the grey area 
above the line 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 2√3 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛. It is located above the dotted line 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛. This is in line with 
Figure 1, i.e. when k=0 and CEOs have identical marginal productivity of the downstream task, 
the cooperative with a member CEO is efficient. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 depicts the relationship when tasks are complements. When −1<k<0, the cooperative 
with an outside CEO is efficient if 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 > 2�3(1−𝑘2)𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 2𝑘𝑓𝑈�3(1−𝑘2), i.e. if it is located in the grey 
area above the line 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 2�3(1−𝑘2)𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 2𝑘𝑓𝑈�3(1−𝑘2). It becomes steeper as k decreases. The value 
of the slope is between � 2
√3
,∞�. The line 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 2�3(1−𝑘2)𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 2𝑘𝑓𝑈�3(1−𝑘2) is located above the 
dotted line 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 . This result is consistent with Figure 1, i.e. when k<0 and CEOs are 
identical in marginal productivity of downstream task, the cooperative with a member CEO is 
uniquely efficient. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Figure 4 depicts the relationship when tasks are substitutes. When 0<k<1, the cooperative with 
an outside CEO is efficient if 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 > (𝑘𝑓𝑈 − 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛) 2�3(1−𝑘2)  subject to 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 < 𝑘𝑓𝑈 , while the 
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cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient if 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 > 2�3(1−𝑘2) (𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 𝑘𝑓𝑈) subject to 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 >
𝑘𝑓𝑈. The cooperative with an outside CEO is therefore efficient if it is located in the grey area 
above the two lines. Both lines will be steeper as k  increases. The intercept increases as k 
increases. There are two intersection points between the line 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = � 2�3(1−𝑘2)𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 2𝑘𝑓𝑈�3(1−𝑘2)� 
and the dotted line 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 . The intersection point A is characterized by 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 =
4𝑘−2𝑘�3(1−𝑘2)
1+3𝑘2
𝑓𝑈 , while point B is characterized by 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 = 4𝑘+2𝑘�3(1−𝑘2)1+3𝑘2 𝑓𝑈 . This is in 
line with figure 1. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The relationship between efficient CEO identity, task interdependence, and the downstream 
productivity differences is summarized in Figure 5. The cooperative with an outside CEO is 
efficient when it is located in the grey area above the curve. Given 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛⁄ , there is more scope 
for cooperatives with member CEOs being efficient when the upstream and downstream tasks 
are complementary,  interdependent, or when the substitution effect is small or large. Given k, 
there is more scope for cooperatives with member CEOs being efficient when the difference 
between the marginal productivities of outsiders and member CEOs is small. 
When 𝑓𝐷
𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑓𝐷
𝑖𝑖 = 1 , the efficient governance structure depends on both k  and the productivity 
difference between upstream and downstream tasks. If 𝑓𝐷 > 2𝑓𝑈 , then the cooperative with a 
member CEO is uniquely efficient. If 𝑓𝐷 < 2𝑓𝑈, then the cooperative with a member CEO is 
efficient when k is small or large. Otherwise the cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient. 
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This is in line with observations from Figure 1. Suppose that dotted line C reflects 𝑓𝐷
𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑓𝐷
𝑖𝑖 = 1 when 
𝑓𝐷 < 2𝑓𝑈, while the dotted line D reflects 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1 when 𝑓𝐷 > 2𝑓𝑈. The curve ∆π = 0 therefore 
has two intersection points with the line 𝑓𝐷
𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑓𝐷
𝑖𝑖 = 1 when 𝑓𝐷 < 2𝑓𝑈 and has no intersection point 
with the line 𝑓𝐷
𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑓𝐷
𝑖𝑖 = 1 when 𝑓𝐷 > 2𝑓𝑈.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Take cooperatives in China as an example to illustrate the results of the model. Cooperatives in 
China are generally in the start-up stage and most cooperative enterprises are characterized by 
small membership size and locality. Most cooperatives only have the first-stage processing such 
as packing rather than further processing. There is either no significant interaction, or a small 
negative (substitute) interdependency effect between the upstream farming and the downstream 
value adding activities. Cooperatives in China therefore favor member CEOs over outside CEOs. 
However, when cooperatives have been developing for many decades or even more than a 
century, they have a highly advanced and complicated value adding business. Most cooperatives 
in the Western world belong to this type. Given the limited time of a member CEO, the 
substitution effect between alternative businesses is large and a professional management 
therefore is necessary.  
In addition, it is difficult for farmer cooperatives in China to sufficiently motivate outside 
professionals due to the under-development of cooperative enterprises. Professionals with high 
productivity would like to choose large companies rather than farmer cooperatives. Outside 
professionals willing to work in cooperatives may not be characterized by high productivity. The 
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difference in productivities between member CEOs and outside professionals is small. Hence, 
cooperatives in China benefit from member CEOs. Nevertheless, as cooperatives in China 
develop in terms of member heterogeneity and enterprise size, and as the intensity of marketing 
competition increases, more and more member CEOs who lack professionalized training in 
marketing and management feel it beyond their capabilities to take charge of the marketing or the 
running of cooperative enterprises. Outside CEOs may become a good choice. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Management behavior in cooperatives is different from that in investor-owned firms. One of the 
distinctive features is that the manager in a cooperative can meanwhile be a member, and 
therefore an owner, of the cooperative enterprise. We compare the efficiency of a cooperative 
with a member as CEO and a cooperative with an outsider as CEO. Results of the model show 
that CEO identity, either a member of the cooperative or an employed outsider, affects the 
economic performance of the cooperative. The condition in which a member CEO or an outside 
CEO is efficient depends on marginal productivities of the upstream and downstream tasks, as 
well as the relationship between upstream farming and downstream value adding tasks.  
When the tasks are complementary and when alternative CEOs have the same marginal 
productivity regarding the downstream value adding activity, a cooperative with a member CEO 
is always efficient, compared to a cooperative with an outside CEO. The efficiency of CEO 
identity depends on the marginal productivities as well as the size of the substitution effect 
between upstream and downstream tasks. In cases where the difference of the marginal 
productivity between upstream and downstream tasks are sufficiently large and/or where the 
substitution effect of upstream and downstream tasks is sufficiently small or large, cooperatives 
with member CEOs are efficient. Otherwise, cooperatives with outside CEOs are efficient.  
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CEOs with different identities may differ in marginal productivity regarding the downstream 
value-adding activities. Outside CEOs tend to be more professional in management and 
marketing, while member CEOs are likely to be more production-oriented. Therefore, the scope 
for cooperatives with member CEOs being uniquely efficient becomes smaller when the 
marginal productivity of outside CEOs’ value adding activity is larger than that of member CEOs’ 
value adding activity, and vice versa. The interdependency between upstream and downstream 
tasks matters to the efficiency of alternative governance structures as well. When the two tasks 
are complements, as the interdependence becomes stronger, the scope that cooperatives with 
member CEOs being efficient becomes larger. Yet when the effect of the substitution effect 
between the two tasks is small or large, the scope that cooperatives with member CEOs being 
efficient is relatively large.   
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Appendix  
Expressions for the surplus of the players 
The equilibrium payoff of the outside CEO is 
𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑠 + 𝑓𝐷2
8
. 
The equilibrium payoff of the members in the cooperative with an outside CEO is 
𝜋𝑚 = 𝑛
2
𝑓𝑈
2 + 𝑓𝐷2
4
− 𝑠. 
The total surplus when the cooperative has an outsider as CEO is 
𝜋𝑇
𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑛𝑓𝑈2
2
+ 3𝑓𝐷2
8
. 
The equilibrium payoff of the member CEO is 
𝜋𝑖𝑛 = 𝑛−1
𝑛
𝑠 + 𝑓𝑈2+𝑓𝐷2−2𝑘𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷
2(1−𝑘2) . 
The equilibrium payoff of the members in the cooperative with a member CEO is 
𝜋𝑚 = (𝑛−1)𝑓𝑈2
2
−
𝑛−1
𝑛
𝑠. 
The total surplus when the cooperative has a member CEO is 
𝜋𝑇
𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑈2+𝑓𝐷2−2𝑘𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷
2(1−𝑘2) + (𝑛−1)𝑓𝑈22 . 
 
Total payoffs when the downstream marginal productivities differ 
The total payoff of the cooperative with a member CEO is  
𝜋𝑇
𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓𝑈2+(𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖)2−2𝑘𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖
2(1−𝑘2) + (𝑛−1)𝑓𝑈22 , 
while the total payoff of the cooperative with an outside CEO is  
𝜋𝑇
𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑛𝑓𝑈2
2
+ 3�𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜�2
8
. 
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As previously defined, ∆𝜋 = 𝜋𝑇𝑖𝑛 − 𝜋𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜. Therefore  
∆𝜋 = 𝜋𝑇𝑖𝑛 − 𝜋𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜 = (𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖)2−2𝑘𝑓𝑈𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖+𝑓𝑈22(1−𝑘2) − 𝑓𝑈22 − 3�𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜�28 . 
We rewrite ∆𝜋 as 
∆𝜋 = (𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑘𝑓𝑈)2
2(1−𝑘2) − 3�𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜�28 . 
Let ∆𝜋 = 0. We have (𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑘𝑓𝑈)2
2(1−𝑘2) − 3�𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜�28 = 0, i.e. 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 = � 2�3(1−𝑘2) (𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 𝑘𝑓𝑈)�. 
Hence, when 𝑓𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜 > � 2�3(1−𝑘2) (𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑛 − 𝑘𝑓𝑈)�, the cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient, 
and vice versa. 
 
